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ABANDONMENT OF A SUNKEN SHIP UNDER
THE WRECK ACT
The owner of a ship accidentally or negligently sunk in a channel
or river is not required to raise it, but may abandon the hulk by
giving notice to the proper authorities. He thereby limits his liability
for removal expenses incurred by the Government or by some private
individual to the value of the sunken vessel, which is forfeited.1 This
is true even though the wreck is a hazard to navigation and completely
blocks a navigable passage. The Wreck Act 2 so limits an owner's lia-
bility unless he fails to abandon the wreck. However, the Act does
provide that it is unlawful deliberately or carelessly to sink a ship in
a navagable channel and to fail to mark such a wreck, unless it is
abandoned. Oftentimes, the applicability of the Wreck Act to a partic-
ular factual situation is not clear from the statutory language, 3 and
thus, its effect is judicially questioned.
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.4 involved the interpreta-
tion and effect of the Wreck Act as it applies to the abandonment
of a sunken craft. The S.S. Texmar, a ship owned by the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation and operated at the time of its sinking under a
bareboat charter 5 by the Calmar Steamship Corporation, grounded
on a shoal in Gray's Harbor, Washington. After several unsuccessful
2E.g., United States v. Zubik, a95 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1961); City of Newark v.
Mills, 35 F.2d 11o (3d Cir. 1929); Petition of Highlands Navigation Corp., 29 F.2d
37 (2d Cir. 1928); Loud v. United States, 286 Fed. 56 (6th Cir. 1923); Orrell v.
Wilmington Iron Works, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.N.C. 195o) , aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 185 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1950); The Manhattan, io F. Supp. 45 (E.D.
Pa. 1935); The Central States, 9 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); The Irving F. Ross,
8 F.2d 313 (D. Mass. 1923); De Bardeleben Coal Co. v. Cox, 16 Ala. App. 172, 76
So. 409 (1917); Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 135 (1870); Hagan v. City of
Richmond, 1o4 Va. 723, 52 S.E. 385 (19o).
'Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, §§ 15, 19,
20, 30 Stat. 1152-54 (1899), 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 414, 415 (1958).
2E.g., Zubik v. United States, 19o F.2d 278 (3 d Cir. 1951); The YFNX-6, 156 F.
Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1957); In re Eastern Transp. Co., 1 o2 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1952).
'319 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1963).
'A bareboat or demise charter is one in which the charterer takes complete
control of the ship for a particular voyage or for a period of time and mans her
with his own people. Here, tie relationship between the charterer and the owner
is analogous to that of a lessee and lessor of a building or tract of land. With
other common types of charters, e.g., time and voyage charters, the vessel is manned
and navigated by the owner. Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 170-73 (1957);
Robinson, Admiralty § 83 (1939).
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attempts -to free it, the ship broke up and sank, obstructing the chan-
nel leading into the harbor. Bethlehem and Calmar notified the Corps
of Army Engineers that they were abandoning the wreck. About two
weeks later the Corps of Engineers informed the two corporations
that it refused to accept the tendered abandonment and that it was
going to remove the ship from the channel at the expense of the owner
and charterer. Subsequently the channel was cleared at a cost of more
than $336,ooo, beyond the salvage value of the ship; the Army then
notified the corporations that it was charging them with this amount.
Bethlehem and Calmar filed a petition in the U.S. District Court
asking for a limitation of liability from this expense. The Government
answered and alleged that the ship had been negligently sunk by the
corporations, and this allegation was taken as true by both the trial
and appellate courts for the purpose of considering the Government's
claim for reimbursement made in the suit and the companies' motion
to dismiss the claim. The United States averred that its claim was valid
because of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act,( and because
even in the absence of this legislation, there was such a liability at
Common law. To point out the construction which it thought should
be given to the Wreck Act, the government cited a U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers regulation which imposed liability for removal costs
on a negligent shipowner.7
On appeal, after the District Court had dismissed the Govern-
ment's claim, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision below. The court pointed out that the pre-
cedents clearly showed that there was no such liability at common law.
Also, it found that the right given the Government under the Wreck
Act was in the nature of an in rem right against the removed vessel
and not an in personam right against the vessel's owner. Since the
particular claim which the Government asserted was not dealt with
in the Wreck Act, the court felt that it should be very hesitant to
read such an obligation into it. One judge of the Court of Appeals
dissented, thinking that Bethlehem and Calmar should stand the
expense of removal because the sinking had been negligent.5 His view
was based on the idea that since the statutory prohibition against
negligent sinking in section 409 of the Wreck Act was directed at per-
sonal conduct, an in personam remedy was implied. Also, he asserted
6Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, §§ 9-20,
3o Stat. 1150-54 (1899), 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-15 (1958).
'Note 4 supra at 52o.
8Id. at 522.
CASE COMMENTS
that United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,9 in which the Government
was granted an injunction to stop the deposit of waste and to restore
the depth of a navagable channel based on a violation of 33 U.S.C. §
403,10 served as a compelling analogy to the case under consideration.
According to the common law, when a vessel accidentally sinks in
a channel or river, the owner can abandon it and thereafter have no
further responsibility for its removal.1" By abandonment, he is re-
lieved of liability even where the sinking is due to his negligence, 12
although there is some contrary authority to this view. 13 But, until the
wreck is abandoned, the owner remains responsible for any unreason-
able obstruction.' 4 If a ship is scuttled intentionally, the shipowner
continues to be responsible for removal even though he abandons. 3
The rationale behind this right of abandonment and of the sub-
sequent limitation of liability is one of public policy designed to en-
courage and promote the maritime industry. It is felt that the owner
has already suffered sufficient loss by the destruction of his ship and
should not be further burdened with having to pay for the cost of re-
moval to restore safe navigation conditions.' 6 Connected with this
policy of nonliability for removal expenses is the idea that where a
vessel blocks or is dangerous to traffic in navigable waters, the re-
sponsibility for its disposition should fall on the public since naviga-
tion conditions are a matter of public concern.' 7
Based on the power of Congress to regulate commerce,' 8 the Fed-
eral Government is given dominion over the navigable waters19 of the
"362 U.S. .182 (1960).
'Section 403 says in part: "The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the
Unitcd States is prohibited... and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill,
or in any manner to alter . . . the . . . condition . . . of the channel of any
navigable water of the United States, unless ... authorized by the Secretary of
the Army...." Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425
§ 1o, 3o Stat. 1151 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1958).
uE.g., Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 135 (1870); White v. Crisp, io Exch.
31u, i56 Eng. Rep. 463 (1854); The King v. Watts, 2 Esp. 675, 170 Eng. Rep. 493
(N.P. 1798); cf. Annot., 3 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1120 (1906).
"45 C.J. Navigable Waters § 95 at 471 n.29. (1928).
roDe Bardeleben Coal Co. v. Cox, 16 Ala. App. 172, 76 So. 409 (1917); Boston &
Hingham Steamboat Co. v. Munson, 117 Mass. 34 (1875).
1445 C.J. Navigable Waters § 95 at 471 (1928).
"-United States v. Hall, 63 Fed. 472, 473 (ist Cir. 1894).
"'Gulf Coast Transp. Co. v. Ruddock-Orleans Cypress Co., 17 F.2d 858 (E.D.
La. 192.7); The Manhattan, io F. Supp. 45, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1935); 45 C.J. Navigable
Waters § 95 at 471 n.28(a) (1928).
171bid.
"U.S. Const. art. i, § 8; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
"33 US.C.A. § 409 n.5 (1957).
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United States to the exclusion of the states.2 0 Under this authority,
the Wreck Act was passed in 1899 as a part of that year's Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act.21 In effect, it preserves the general mari-
time common law.2 2 Section 40923 of the Act prohibits the wilful or
negligent sinking of a vessel in navigable channels and directs that
a sunken craft be immediately marked unless abandoned. Also this
section asserts that it is the owner's duty to proceed with the timely
removal of the craft, and that a failure to do so is considered to be an
abandonment which permits the United States to take possession
and remove it. Section 41424 sets forth the procedure for removal by
the Secretary of the Army where the wrecked ship has been aban-
doned. This provision regulates the relationship between the United
States and the owner and applies without regard to the cause of the
sinking.
25
Unless a shipowner abandons his sunken craft as provided for in
the Wreck Act, he may lose his right to limit liability to the value of
the ship and may become personally liable for removal expenses and
OE.g., City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 334 (1958).
2 Note 6 supra. 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 414 and 415 are known as the Wreck Act.
2"The Rivers and Harbors [Appropriation] Act of March 3, 1899 ... recognized
the right of abandonment given by the general maritime law, and points out the
intention of Congress to preserve that right." Petition of Highlands Nav. Corp., 29
F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1928). In The Manhattan, 1o F. Supp. 45, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1935),
it was suggested that a possible change in the common law was effected by these
statutes in that the Government is given the wreck itself to cover expenses where
it undertakes to remove the ship after abandonment, or is given a lien against the
raised craft for the cost of removal where the United States has taken possession
of the wreck because of emergency before it has actually been abandoned.
21 409 ... It shall not be lawful ... to voluntarily or carelessly sink, or permit
or cause to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels .... And whenever
a vessel, raft, or other craft is wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel, accidently
or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the owner of such sunken craft to immediately
mark it with a buoy or beacon during the day and a lighted lantern at night, and
to maintain such marks until the sunken craft is removed or abandoned, and the
neglect or failure of the said owner so to do shall be unlawful; and it shall be
the duty of the owner of such sunken craft to commence the immediate removal
of the same, and prosecute such removal diligently, and failure to do so shall be
considered as an abandonment of such craft, and subject the same to removal by
the United States...." 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1958).
2433 U.S.C. § 414 (1958). "Section 414 merely reaffirms the law as it stood by
which the owner terminates his liability by abandonment (which may consist of
doing nothing for 3o days) and the Secretary of... [the Army]is authorized (but
not required) to assume the general governmental duty of clearing the navigable
channel. Section 415 provides that he may perform this duty without waiting for
abandonment by the owner." The Manhattan, io F. Supp. 45, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1935).
-Note 4 supra at 524.
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for damages to other ships which run against it.26 Abandonment as
contemplated by section 409 may apparently be accompanied by the
actual notification to the U.S. Government of such an intention.27
This may be effected through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,2s
the U.S. Coast Guard,29 or other appropriate governmental agencies.
There is a similar procedure at common law where some public of-
ficial such as a harbor master must be notified of the abandonment. 30
According to sections 414 and 415,31 there is a presumption of the
abandonment after thirty days, 32 and the Secretary of the Army, even
though thirty days has not passed, has the right to take immediate
possession of a sunken wreck and proceed to remove or destroy it,
if there is an emergency as a result of the hazard. 33 The provisions con-
cerning abandonment under sections 414 and 415 merely terminate
ownership and do not relate to the imposition of liability where there
has been fault in the cause of the sinking. If there has been fault, lia-
bility may be imposed under section 4o9.3
4
The Wreck Act is primarily a criminal statute dealing with the
marking and removal of wrecks. 35 The provision relating to the neg-
ligent sinking of vessels, so far as civil liability is concerned, is simply
declaratory of the common law obligation to exercise due care.3 6 Some
decisions have used the Wreck Act to impose civil liability on a ship-
-1See The Snug Harbor, 53 F.2d 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); People's Coal Co. v. Second
Pool Coal Co., 181 Fed. 609 (V.D. Pa. igio).
-'Id. 33 U.S.CA. §§ 409 n.19, 414 n.6 (1957).
2-See 33 U.S.C.A. § 414 (1957).
2See Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Pitney, 187 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1951);
New York Marine Co. v. Mulligan, 31 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1929); The Plymouth,
225 Fed. 483 (2d Cir. 19'5); The Snug Harbor, 53 F.2d 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1931). Some
of the earlier cases refer to notification of the Lighthouse Service. This Service has
now been incorporated into the U.S. Coast Guard. 1963-64 United States Gov't
Organization Manual 121 (1963).
nE.g., The Douglas, 7 P.D. 151 (1882).
31Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, §§ 19, 20,
3o Stat. 1154 (1899), 33 U.S.C. §§ 414, 415 (1958).
OE.g., Orrell v. Wilmington Iron Works, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.N.C. 1950) ,
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 185 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 195o).
'33 U.S.C.A. § 415 (1957).
'433 F.C.A. § 4o9 nn. 32-45 (1960).
"'33 U.S.C. § 411 (1958) imposes criminal penalties on persons or corporations
who do not comply with section 409. A violation of this section is said to constitute
a misdemeanor, and a conviction therefor is punishable by a fine of from $5oo to
S25oo, or 3o days to i year imprisonment, or both.
3Sullivan v. P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 263 Fed. 348 (2d Cir. 190o); The YFNX-6,
156 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1957); People's Coal Co. v. Second Pool Coal Co., x81
Fed. 6o9 (W.D. Pa. igio).
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owner for his wrongful acts,3 7 in accordance with the view that where
a statute makes certain conduct criminally punishable, civil liability
for damages caused by the unlawful conduct attaches though not pro-
scribed in the statute.38
Whether Congress in drafting the Wreck Act meant to include
such a claim as the United States asserted in the Bethlehem case is not
entirely clear. However, it is possible that a claim of this sort could
be included. The Army Corps of Engineers regulation,39 which the
government cited, is illustrative of this view. The regulation recognizes
that an owner may abandon his sunken craft if it sank without fault
on his part; but if the sinking was due to negligence or wilfullness, he
cannot relieve himself from criminal or civil liability by merely aban-
doning the wreck. It states that if the owner has wrongfully allowed
his vessel to sink, he may be subject to criminal penalties. He may also
be compelled to remove the wreck or to pay for its removal. To im-
pose liability such as this does not seem to go beyond the scope of
section 409. 4 0 In fact, the bare language of the section appears to
allow this result.
4 1
-F.g., Petition of Boat Demand, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 668 (D. Mass. 1959); In re
Eastern Transp. Co., 1o2 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1952). See also, United States v.
Hall, 63 Fed. 472 (1st Cir. 1894).
3Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 Cor-
nell L.Q. (1951); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions,
49 Colum. L. Rev. 21 (1949).
0"20o9.4io Abandonment of Wrecks. By the maritime law the owner of a vessel
which is sunk without fault on his part may abandon the wreck in which case
he cannot be held responsible for removing it even though it obstructs navigation.
That law has not been changed by sections 15, ig, and 20 of the River and Harbor
Act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. 1152, 1154; 33 U.S.C. 409, 414, 415), which fully
recognize the owner's right of abandonment. However, a person who willfully or
negligently permits a vessel to sink in navigable waters of the United States may
not relieve himself from all liability by merely abandoning the wreck. He may
be found guilty of a misdemeanor or punished by fine, imprisonment, or both,
and in addition may have his license revoked or suspended. He may also be com-
pelled to remove the wreck as a public nuisance or to pay for its removal." 33 C.F.R.
§ 209410 (1962).
I0The dissenting judge in the Bethlehem case said: "An innocent shipowner
should be free of removal costs because his innocence places him beyond the
reach of the prohibition in Section 409; but one who voluntarily or carelessly sinks
a vessel should not be permitted to avoid liability for the costs of his wrongdoing
simply because he happens also to own the vessel, and chooses, in his own interest,
to abandon it." Note 4 supra at 523.
"Note 4 supra at 523-26. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 409 (1957). "...Section 409, when
properly construed, permits abandonment of a vessel only as a result of such things
as fire, storm, collision or unforeseen unseaworthiness, and that if abandonment
results under such circumstances the craft becomes subject to removal by the
Government pursuant to Section 414, but that it is only under such conditions that
